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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
Robert L. Small, an inmate at the Camden County 
Correctional Facility (―CCCF‖), appeals the dismissal of his 
civil rights action against Camden County, CCCF, 
approximately thirty individual medical personnel and prison 
officers, and nine John Does (collectively, ―Defendants‖), for 
his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as he was 
required to do by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(―PLRA‖), 110 Stat. 1321-71, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1997e(a).  We will affirm in part and vacate in part.    
 
I.  Background 
 Small is a New Jersey state prisoner.  He is a 
paraplegic and confined to a wheelchair.  As relevant here, at 
various times between June and September 2004, and again 
between May 2005 and January 2008, Small was a pretrial 
detainee at CCCF.  Each time, he entered CCCF with his own 
wheelchair equipped with leg rests.  
 
  In March 2006, Small filed this action, pro se, under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The District Court appointed pro bono 
counsel, and a second amended complaint was filed on 
January 15, 2008.  In that complaint, Small asserted claims 
against Defendants arising from fourteen incidents that he 
alleged occurred between August 2004 and September 2006.  
Those incidents involved, among other misconduct, the use of 
excessive force, the denial of medical treatment, and the 
confiscation of his personal wheelchair and its replacement 
with one without leg rests.  When left with what he alleges 
was an improper replacement, he claims he was unable to 
brush his teeth, shower, and on several occasions, was left to 
lie for days in his own excrement.    
 
In late 2009, after the completion of merits discovery, 
Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among 
other things, that Small failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies pursuant to CCCF‘s grievance procedures before 
 4 
filing suit.
1
  These procedures, which are set forth in CCCF‘s 
inmate handbook, are reproduced in full in the Appendix to 
this Opinion.  In broad summary, however, they provide that 
a prisoner may, within 15 days after a grievable incident,  file 
a formal, written grievance on a grievance form or, if a 
grievance form is not available, on plain paper.  Grievable 
incidents include violations of civil, constitutional or statutory 
rights, criminal acts, and unsafe or unsanitary conditions.  
After a grievance is filed, it is reviewed by a grievance officer 
who time stamps and logs it into the prison computer system.  
If improperly filed, the grievance is returned to the prisoner.  
If properly filed and logged in, it is forwarded to the 
appropriate Shift Commander to be addressed within 72 
hours.  If not resolved in that time, it is returned to the 
grievance officer for review and resolution within 10 days.  If 
the prisoner is not satisfied with the grievance officer‘s 
decision, he may appeal, in writing, to the Warden (or his 
designee) within 10 days.  The Warden‘s decision is final.  
 
On May 11, 2010, the District Court denied 
Defendants‘ motions without prejudice and stated its intention 
to hold an evidentiary hearing to decide the exhaustion issue 
before reaching any of the other asserted bases for summary 
judgment.
 
 Initially, the Court gave Small the option of having 
an advisory jury serve as fact finder at the hearing, an option 
he accepted.  Shortly thereafter, however, the Court became 
aware of our then-recent decision in Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 
F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2010), which stated, albeit in dicta, that 
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a question of law to 
be determined by the judge.  Id. at 782.  The Court provided 
Small with two options: (1) brief the issue further; or (2) 
withdraw his request for an advisory jury.  Small withdrew 
his request.   
 
On June 23 and 24, 2010, the District Court held an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether Small properly filed 
a grievance and thereafter exhausted each of the fourteen 
incidents of which he complained.  The Court heard 
                                                 
1
 The District Court granted Defendants‘ motions for leave to 
file an amended answer adding exhaustion of administrative 
remedies as an affirmative defense.   
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testimony from Small and two prison officials, Lt. Karen 
Taylor and Sgt. Reginald Atkins, and reviewed the extensive 
collection of documents Small submitted to demonstrate his 
compliance with CCCF‘s grievance procedures.  The Court 
went through the grievances one by one, ultimately 
concluding that Small failed to exhaust all but one of them, 
and explaining at length why it had reached that conclusion.  
By order entered June 25, 2010, the Court dismissed the 
complaint as to all but that one, and after it eventually settled, 
the Court entered the final order in the case on March 4, 
2011.  Small appealed.  We granted Small‘s motion for 
appointment of counsel on appeal.   
 
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343(a)(3), and 1367.  We have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the determination of a failure to 
exhaust de novo, including whether that determination was 
properly made by a judge rather than a jury.  Spruill v. Gillis, 
372 F.3d 218, 226 (3d Cir. 2004); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 
523, 529 (3d Cir. 2003).  We accept the Court‘s factual 
conclusions unless clearly erroneous,   Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 215 F.3d 407, 409 (3d 
Cir. 2000), and will, therefore, ―upset a finding of fact . . . 
only if [we have] ‗the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed.‘‖ Haines v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 
975 F.2d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).  We must, of course, 
accord respect to determinations of the credibility of 
witnesses.  United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 441 (3d 
Cir. 1997) (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 
564, 575 (1985)). 
III. Analysis 
 In an effort to curb the number of prisoner filings in 
the federal courts, Congress enacted the PLRA which, as 
relevant here, mandates that prisoners exhaust internal prison 
grievance procedures before filing suit.  28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 
(2006); Spruill, 372 F.3d at 222.  The exhaustion provision of 
 6 
the PLRA reads:  
 
No action shall be brought with respect to 
prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. §] 1983, or 
any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in 
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 
until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted. 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Failure to exhaust is an affirmative 
defense the defendant must plead and prove; it is not a 
pleading requirement for the prisoner-plaintiff.  Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212, 216–17 (2007); see Ray v. Kertes, 
285 F.3d 287, 295 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that failure to 
exhaust is an affirmative defense and finding that the district 
court erred in imposing an improperly heightened pleading 
standard that required the prisoner not only to plead, but also 
to prove, exhaustion in the complaint). Furthermore, the 
defendant must prove that the prisoner-plaintiff failed to 
exhaust each of his claims.  There is no ―total exhaustion‖ 
rule permitting dismissal of an entire action because of one 
unexhausted claim.  Jones, 549 U.S. at 220–24. 
 
A. Exhaustion: For a Judge or a Jury?  
 Small argues that, under the PLRA, a jury, not a judge, 
should determine factual disputes relating to the issue of 
exhaustion because Seventh Amendment rights are 
implicated.  In Drippe,  however, we stated, unconditionally 
and in agreement with the Seventh Circuit‘s holding in Pavey 
v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2010), that exhaustion 
is a question of law to be determined by a judge, even if that 
determination requires the resolution of disputed facts.
2
  
Drippe, 604 F.3d. at 781.  At issue in Drippe were the timing 
requirements for raising exhaustion as an affirmative defense, 
                                                 
2
 The Pavey court confronted the identical question we face 
here: ―whether a prisoner plaintiff in a suit for damages 
governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act is entitled by 
the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial on any debatable 
factual issues relating to the defense of failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies.‖ 544 F.3d at 740.   
 7 
and so our statement, strong as it was, was dicta.   We now 
hold what we so strongly signaled in Drippe, a conclusion 
that has been reached as well by every one of our sister 
circuits to have considered the issue.   
 
 The Seventh Amendment provides that ―[i]n Suits at 
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.‖ 
U.S. Const. amend. VII.  In an action under § 1983, the 
parties have a right to a jury trial on the merits, City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 
687, 709 (1999), but this right does not guarantee resolution 
by a jury of all factual disputes. Whether the right to a jury 
trial applies depends upon ―the nature of the issue . . . rather 
than the character of the overall action.‖ Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970); see Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260, 
271–72 (5th Cir. 2010).    
 
  Under the PLRA, exhaustion is a precondition for 
bringing suit under § 1983.  42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (―No action 
shall be brought with respect to prison conditions . . . until 
such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.‖ 
(emphasis added)). As such, just as subject-matter 
jurisdiction,
 3
 personal jurisdiction, and venue, exhaustion is a 
                                                 
3
 Exhaustion is a non-jurisdictional prerequisite.  See 
Woodford, 548 U.S. at 101.  That is not to say, however, that 
the nature of a jurisdictional assessment, as a threshold 
inquiry, cannot provide guidance in an exhaustion inquiry.  
See Dillon, 596 F.3d at 272 (―Exhaustion resembles personal 
jurisdiction and venue in that it is an affirmative defense that 
allows defendants to assert that plaintiffs have not invoked 
the proper forum for resolving a dispute.‖); Bryant v. Rich, 
530 F.3d 1368, 1374 (11th Cir. 2008) (―Even though a 
failure-to-exhaust defense is non-jurisdictional,
 
it is like a 
defense for lack of jurisdiction in one important sense: 
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ‗matter[ ] in 
abatement, and ordinarily [does] not deal with the merits.‘‖ 
(quoting 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1360 at 78 n.15 (3d ed. 2004) 
(alterations in original))); see also 18 James Wm. Moore, 
Moore’s Federal Practice § 131.30(3)(b) at 104 (3rd ed. 
 8 
―threshold issue that courts must address to determine 
whether litigation is being conducted in the right forum at the 
right time.‖ Dillon, 596 F.3d at 272 (emphasis added); see 
Pavey, 544 F.3d at 741 (―Juries decide cases, not issues of 
judicial traffic control.  Until the issue of exhaustion is 
resolved, the court cannot know whether it is to decide the 
case or the prison authorities are to.‖); cf. McCarthy v. 
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (likening the doctrine of 
exhaustion of administrative remedies to ―abstention, finality, 
and ripeness-that govern the timing of federal-court 
decisionmaking‖); Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 
303 U.S. 41, 50-51 n.9 (1938) (describing exhaustion as a 
―rule of judicial administration‖).  Those of our sister circuits 
to have considered the issue have held that a plaintiff in a 
lawsuit governed by the PLRA is not entitled to a jury trial on 
the issue of exhaustion.  See Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305, 
308–09 (2d Cir. 2011); Dillon, 596 F.3d at 272; Pavey, 544 
F.3d at 742; Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 1373-77 (11th 
Cir. 2008); Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119–20 (9th 
Cir. 2003). No court has held, as Small would have us hold, 
that decision of that issue implicates Seventh Amendment 
rights.
4
   
                                                                                                             
2008) (noting that a determination ―that [a court] has no 
subject matter jurisdiction, that personal jurisdiction of 
defendants or of indispensable parties is lacking, that venue is 
improper, or that plaintiff has failed to comply with some 
prerequisite to filing suit, such as exhaustion of 
administrative remedies . . . is not a determination of the 
claim, but rather a refusal to hear it‖ (emphasis added)).   
4
 Small‘s comparison of exhaustion to a statute of limitations, 
a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense which may be tried to 
a jury as of right, is ill fitting. Exhaustion and statutes of 
limitation are very different mechanisms, instituted to serve 
opposite purposes.  As the Second Circuit observed, 
exhaustion is a key to open the courthouse door; statutes of 
limitation, conversely, close that door.  Messa, 652 F.3d at 
310.  Furthermore, unlike a statute of limitations, a failure to 
exhaust is not always fatal.  The prisoner-plaintiff may go 
back and exhaust if not foreclosed by grievance deadlines or 
if the judge has determined that the failure to exhaust was 
beyond the prisoner‘s control (e.g., prison officials prevented 
 9 
 
 As we have already suggested, it is of no consequence 
that here, as is often the case, there are disputed facts that 
must be resolved in order to determine whether the claims 
were exhausted.  See Bryant, 530 F.3d at 1373–74 (holding 
the district court properly acted as fact finder in resolving 
conflicting evidence that raised a genuine issue of material 
fact about whether administrative remedies were available to 
the prisoner plaintiffs); accord Messa, 652 F.3d at 309; 
Dillon, 596 F.3d at 271.  Matters of judicial administration 
often require judges to decide factual disputes and the 
Seventh Amendment is not implicated as long as the facts are 
not bound up with the merits of the underlying dispute.  See 
Messa, 652 F.3d at 310 (―The Seventh Amendment does not 
promise a jury trial on all issues that might, as a practical 
matter, finally dispose of a case.  Rather, it guarantees the 
right to a jury‘s resolution of the merits of the ultimate 
dispute.‖ (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 
370, 377 (1996) and In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 309–10 
(1920))); see also Alliance for Envtl. Renewal v. Pyramid 
Crossgates Co., 436 F.3d 82, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2006).  Small 
does not suggest that the facts relating to his exhaustion of 
administrative remedies or his failure to exhaust are at all 
intertwined with the merits of his claims.   
 
In sum, we agree with the Second, Fifth, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and hold that judges may resolve 
factual disputes relevant to the exhaustion issue without the 
participation of a jury.
 
 Accordingly, the District Court did not 
err by acting as the fact finder because exhaustion constitutes 
a preliminary issue for which no right to a jury trial exists.
5  
                                                                                                             
the prisoner from exhausting).  See Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.   
5
 It would make sense from an efficiency standpoint that 
exhaustion determinations be made before discovery, or with 
only limited discovery.  See Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742 (―We 
emphasize that in the ordinary case discovery with respect to 
the merits should be deferred until the issue of exhaustion is 
resolved. If merits discovery is allowed to begin before that 
resolution, the statutory goal of sparing federal courts the 
burden of prisoner litigation until and unless the prisoner has 
exhausted his administrative remedies will not be achieved.‖).  
 10 
 
B. District Court’s Findings of Fact 
Having determined that the District Court did not err 
by serving as fact finder on the exhaustion issue, we turn our 
attention to the Court‘s findings themselves, findings we must 
accept unless clearly erroneous.  The Court correctly placed 
the burden on Defendants to prove non-exhaustion and 
conducted a two-day, painstakingly thorough inquiry into the 
exhaustion issue as to each of Small‘s claims.  (J.A. 83–437).  
The Court then carefully, and in much detail, reviewed the 
testimony and documentary evidence, made credibility 
determinations to which we must defer, and rendered its 
decision.     
 
i. Availability of Administrative Remedies 
 Although the availability of administrative remedies to 
a prisoner is a question of law, Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 
111 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Ray, 285 F.3d at 291), it 
necessarily involves a factual inquiry.  See Dillon, 596 F.3d at 
266 (―[W]hile it is a question of law whether administrative 
remedies qualify as being ‗available‘ under 42 U.S.C. § 
1997e(a), availability may sometimes turn on questions of 
fact.‖).   ―‗Available‘ means ‗capable of use; at hand.‘‖ 
Brown, 312 F.3d at 113 (citing Webster’s II, New Riverside 
University Dictionary 141 (1994 ed.)).  Remedies that are not 
reasonably communicated to inmates may be considered 
unavailable for exhaustion purposes.  Id.; see Dillon, 596 F.3d 
at 268 (recognizing ―the importance of ensuring that inmates 
have avenues for discovering the procedural rules governing 
their grievances‖); Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1323 
(11th Cir. 2007) (―That which is unknown and unknowable is 
unavailable . . . .‖)).   
 
The District Court found that Small received an inmate 
handbook (which, as we have noted, outlines CCCF‘s 
grievance procedures) upon his entry to the prison, or shortly 
                                                                                                             
Here, merits discovery had been completed, although only 
limited discovery would likely have been necessary on the 
exhaustion issue itself.   
 11 
thereafter,
6
 and, in any event, that he was aware of those 
procedures.   We agree that, wholly aside from whether Small 
in fact was given a handbook, there was ample evidence that 
he nonetheless knew of, and had access to, CCCF‘s grievance 
procedures and, thus, that administrative remedies were 
―available‖ to him.   
 
Although Small continues to contend he did not 
receive a handbook until 2007, and therefore was unaware 
until then of the grievance procedures, we cannot help but 
observe that, among other things, he properly filed his first 
grievance form, fully compliant with those procedures, on 
August 30, 2004.  Indeed, Small testified that by that time he 
knew of the procedures and the need to file a formal 
grievance.  He also testified that although he had access to the 
law library, he never requested a copy of the handbook.  
Finally, although he claims that prison officials prevented him 
from accessing grievance forms, he testified that these alleged 
obstructionist efforts did not prevent him from obtaining a 
form, one way or another, when he needed one.  In any event, 
the procedures allow grievances to be filed on plain paper.   
 
In sum, the record is clear that Small knew of, and was 
able to access, CCCF‘s grievance procedures.  We, thus, 
conclude, that administrative remedies were available to him.       
 
ii. Substantial Compliance with CCCF’s Grievance 
Procedures 
 
 ―[T]o properly exhaust administrative remedies 
prisoners must ‗complete the administrative review process in 
accordance with the applicable procedural rules,‘ rules that 
                                                 
6
 For a host of reasons, the District Court did not find credible 
Small‘s assertion that he did not receive a handbook before 
2007, including the undisputed fact that CCCF issues a 
handbook during the intake process, and so it was 
unbelievable that Small never received even one despite his 
several readmissions to CCCF.  The Court also found that 
even if Small had never been given a handbook, they were 
readily available at CCCF and he could easily have obtained 
one.   
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are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance 
process itself.‖ Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (citation omitted) 
(quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 88).  To ―complete the 
administrative review process,‖ we have held, means 
―substantial‖ compliance with the prison‘s grievance 
procedures.  See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231 (citing Nyhuis v. 
Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 77–78 (3d Cir. 2000)).  The District Court 
found, in its review of the grievances at issue before us, that 
Small had not substantially complied with CCCF‘s grievance 
procedures as to any of them, for different reasons specific to 
each one, and had thereby failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies.
7
  
 
 It has been with some difficulty that we have parsed 
out the who, what, where, and when regarding each of the 
grievances at issue, and we applaud the District Court for its 
yeoman efforts in this regard.  Indeed, we agree with the 
Court as to the failings of the vast majority of the grievances 
and, without being as specific as the Court, we briefly explain 
why.  Submitting a Sick Call Request, for example, a form on 
which a prisoner requests medical attention, is not a 
submission in compliance with CCCF‘s grievance 
procedures.  As the District Court explained, ―Sick Call 
Requests are prospective requests for medical services, they 
are not retrospective complaints about the denial of services.‖ 
(J.A. 442).  Moreover, any asserted belief that a medical-
related grievance was to be filed by means of a Sick Call 
Request form is belied by Small‘s submission of grievance 
forms complaining about deficient medical care.   Beyond 
even that, Small testified to the difference between a Sick 
Call Request, ―a small little form that you fill out with your 
information on it to request medical attention,‖ (Id. at 155), 
and a grievance form, ―a much larger form that you fill out if 
you have a complaint against something in the institution.‖ 
                                                 
7
 Small concedes that certain incidents were not grieved in 
substantial compliance with CCCF‘s grievance procedures: 
July 7, 2006, July 20, 2006, and August 14, 2006, and does 
not take issue with the District Court‘s dismissal of the claims 
arising from these incidents.  Small also testified that he did 
not wish to pursue the grievance relating to the incident of 
August 16, 2004.     
 13 
(Id. at 156).   
 
 Similarly, the District Court properly discounted letters 
Small wrote that were not submitted in compliance with 
CCCF‘s requirements for the proper filing of grievances (e.g., 
they were not directed to the grievance officer or any 
corrections staff, were not filed within 15 days of the alleged 
incident, or failed to identify the specifics of the incident); 
indeed, the majority of those letters were sent to individuals 
outside of prison administration, thus failing to serve the 
basic purpose of the grievance filing mechanism, which is to 
notify officials of a problem and provide an opportunity for 
efficient correction.  With respect to the grievances, the 
subject of Small‘s letters and Sick Call Request forms, the 
Court correctly concluded that Small‘s efforts were not 
substantially compliant with CCCF‘s grievance procedures 
and so could not serve as a basis for satisfying the PLRA‘s 
exhaustion requirement.   
 
We believe, however, that the District Court erred 
insofar as it found that although grievances had been 
submitted in compliance with CCCF‘s procedures  as to the 
incidents of June 18, 2005 and June 28, 2005, those 
grievances should nonetheless be dismissed because Small 
did not file an appeal as to either one.
8
  The Court concluded 
that Small‘s failure to appeal rendered his efforts 
noncompliant with CCCF‘s procedures and, therefore, that his 
administrative remedies as to them were unexhausted.  There 
is no dispute, however, that there was no decision as to either 
of those grievances (or, we note, any of the others now before 
us), and we disagree with the Court that substantial 
compliance with CCCF‘s procedures requires appealing non-
decisions.  CCCF‘s procedures discuss only the appeal of a 
decision with which the inmate is not satisfied, and do not 
mention what must or even could be done by the inmate when 
a decision is never made: ―If the inmate is not satisfied with 
the grievance officer‘s decision, He/She may appeal to the 
Warden . . . .‖ (J.A. 675).  Thus, the Court erroneously read 
                                                 
8
 The District Court found that certain other grievances had 
not been appealed, but those grievances did not, for other 
reasons, comply with CCCF‘s grievance procedures.   
 14 
an additional requirement into CCCF‘s grievance 
procedures.
9
   
 
Because CCCF procedures did not contemplate an 
appeal from a non-decision, when Small failed to receive 
even a response to the grievances addressing the June 18 and 
June 28, 2005 incidents, much less a decision as to those 
grievances, the appeals process was unavailable to him.  See 
Lewis v. Washington, 300 F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(agreeing with the Eighth and Fifth Circuits that 
―administrative remedies [are] exhausted when prison 
officials fail to respond to inmate grievances because those 
remedies ha[ve] become ‗unavailable‘‖); Jernigan v. Stuchell, 
304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (―[T]he failure to 
respond to a grievance within the time limits contained in the 
grievance policy renders an administrative remedy 
unavailable‖); see also Boyd v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 
989, 996 (6th Cir. 2004) (―[A]dministrative remedies are 
exhausted when prison officials fail to timely respond to a 
properly filed grievance‖); Powe v. Ennis, 177 F.3d 393, 394 
(5th Cir. 1999) (―A prisoner‘s administrative remedies are 
deemed exhausted when a valid grievance has been filed and 
the state‘s time for responding thereto has expired.‖); cf. 
Brown, 312 F.3d at 111 (―The PLRA does not require 
exhaustion of all remedies. Rather, it requires exhaustion of 
such administrative remedies as are available.‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
order of the District Court dismissing those grievances and 
remand for further proceedings as to them.
10
      
                                                 
9
 That Small could appeal a non-decision, as the District 
Court noted, was evident by his 2006 letter to Superintendent 
Eric Taylor complaining about the lack of response to a 
previously filed grievance, says nothing about whether he was 
required to do so by virtue of a CCCF procedural requirement 
to appeal a non-decision.  (J.A. 153–54, 444, 841).    
10
 We need not reach whether the District Court should have 
deemed the two remaining grievances to be part of a 
―continuing violation‖ for purposes of the exhaustion 
requirement.  At least one incident must have been properly 
grieved for the doctrine to apply assuming, of course, that the 
doctrine would apply at all.  In his opening brief, Small 
 15 
IV. Conclusion  
 We will vacate the order of the District Court 
dismissing the grievances arising from the incidents of June 
18, 2005 and June 28, 2005, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.  We will, in all 
other respects, affirm the order of the District Court 
dismissing the complaint.   
 
 
                                                                                                             
argues that he was ―deprived of a wheelchair with leg rests 
continuously from April 13, 2006.‖  (Appellant‘s Br. 39).  At 
oral argument, counsel confirmed that the alleged ―continuing 
violation‖ occurred from April 2006 onward, or at least from 
July 2006 onward.  There was, however, no properly grieved 
incident on or after these dates to serve as the basis for a 
continuing violation.  
___________ 
 
APPENDIX 
____________ 
 
 
INMATE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
1
 
 
It is the policy of this Department to provide to its inmates an 
internal grievance mechanism for the resolution of 
Complaints arising from institutional matters, so as to reduce 
the need for litigation and afford everyone the opportunity to 
have input in the improvement of the facility operations.   
 
This inmate grievance procedure is an internal administrative 
means for the resolution of complaint and the identification of 
potentially problematic areas.  This procedure is designed to 
supplement, but not replace, the informal communication 
process or the institutional disciplinary procedure. 
 
An inmate may file a grievance at any time to bring a 
problem to the attention of staff or to appeal a specific action.  
An inmate may file a grievance only for him/herself, although 
an inmate may assist another inmate in filing a grievance.  
 
Only one grievance may be filed at one time on a single 
incident or item of concern.  An inmate may withdraw a 
previously filed grievance at any time.  
 
No staff member may retaliate against an inmate for filing or 
withdrawing a grievance.  
 
A grievance may be initiated for any one the following 
reasons: 
 
 An alleged violation of civil, constitutional or statutory 
right or policy  
                                                 
1
 Text reproduced from the Camden County Correctional 
Facility’s inmate handbook.  (J.A. 674–75).  Any errors are in 
the original.       
 
 2 
 An alleged criminal or prohibited act by a staff 
member  
 To resolve a condition existing within the facility that 
creates unsafe or unsanitary living conditions  
 To appeal decisions such as restoration of lost good 
time, modification of restricted visiting, correspondence or 
other privileges.  
 Disciplinary actions may be appealed but not grieved.   
 
An inappropriately filed grievance or one that is directed 
towards an issue that cannot be grieved will be returned to the 
inmate.  
 
Inmates are encouraged to resolve grievances informally by 
voicing their grievances to any staff member.  The grievances 
must be voiced in a courteous, responsible and clear fashion.  
When presented with an informal grievance the staff member 
may initiate corrective action if the action is within the 
normal scope of the employee responsibility.  However, if the 
inmate grievance is beyond the scope of the staff member, he 
shall notify their supervisor as soon as practical.  All 
reasonable steps will be taken to resolve the grievances 
informally within the approved discretion of the Shift 
Commander.  If the matter can not or should not be resolved 
the inmate may initiate a formal grievance.   
 
An inmate of the Camden County Department of Corrections 
may file a formal, written grievance anytime within 15 days 
after any event has occurred where a grievance may be 
warranted.  The inmate will be provided with a grievance 
form by any staff member.  However, the inmate may use 
plain paper, if no grievance forms are available.  If a 
grievance on plain paper is received by the grievance officer.  
The inmate will be supplied with grievance form with 24 
hours of the date grievance was received.  All staff members 
will instruct the inmate on the basic requirements for filling 
out the form, if requested.   
 
All grievances will be collected daily and time stamped and 
logged by the Department’s Grievance Officer.  The 
grievance officer will review all grievances to assure that the 
complaint can be grieved.   
 3 
 
If the grievance meets our guidelines, it will be forwarded to 
the appropriate Shift Commander for possible resolution 
within 72 hours of an investigation.  
 
If the grievance is not resolved in 72 hours it will be return to 
the grievance officer for review and resolution within 10 
days.  If the inmate is not satisfied with the grievance 
officer’s decision, He/She may appeal to the Warden (or his 
designee) in 10 days in writing.  The decision will be final.   
 
 
